STEERING VACCINES THROUGH THE UK SYSTEM -WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS?
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Vaccines are one of the greatest triumphs of healthcare innovation. They have saved millions of lives, prevented destructive chronic illnesses and eased pressures on health services across the globe. The UK NHS constitution states that everyone has the right to receive vaccinations recommended by the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) under a NHS-provided national immunisation programme 1 .
We provide an outline of the route to potential reimbursement, using recent examples, and guidance based on lessons learnt.
Context: It should be noted that the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) applies as much to vaccines as it does to medicines provided that they have a brand name and marketing authorisation. The only exceptions are procurements of centrally supplied vaccines and stockpiled medicines.
Published UK articles, The Health and Social Care Act 2012 2 , The Green Book 3 , government records and industry records were scrutinised and summarised into an outline of the process undertaken to make vaccines available. Examples of vaccines that have been through the UK process, the challenges they have faced and potential solutions to those challenges were also examined. get 
Results
Some vaccine manufacturers and commentators claim that it is surprisingly difficult to navigate the UK system.
The vaccine approval and funding process, including review by the JCVI, is outlined in Figure 1 . There are no specific timelines for this process as it runs on a case by case basis. This is illustrated in the example in Box 1, which summarises the process of approval of menningococcal B vaccine.
The National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and JCVI follow different approaches to the assessment of technologies as shown in Table 1 including varying degrees of public and stakeholder involvement.
Objectives
Companies proposing to bring vaccines to market need to pay special attention to navigating this complicated structure, well in advance.
This preparation is needed to achieve a satisfactory price, which rewards research, development and other costs, within a reasonable period. Exploring scenarios based on potential immunisation programmes and associated revenue projections could also help to inform subsequent contract negotiations.
Compared to the NICE technology appraisal process, review by the JCVI is less well defined and less transparent, with less emphasis on the manufacturer to provide evidence. This research highlights the need for manufacturers to approach review of vaccines in a similar way. There are multiple factors that affect the likelihood of positive and negative guidance including:
• Preparing a clear case of the unmet need
• Developing a robust economic case in line with NICE methodology to predict what JCVI might conclude so that assumptions can be challenged as they could be inaccurate
• Generating publications to support the evidence review
• Consultation with a wide group of stakeholders (clinicians, epidemiologists, academic groups and health economists)
In March 2014, after a lengthy review process involving multiple stakeholders and several reiterations of the economic modeling, the JCVI recommended Bexsero® meningococcal B vaccine within the NHS immunisation schedule for infants 4 . The sub-committee met five times between 2011 and 2013. Evidence considered included epidemiological analyses from the UK health protection organisations, submissions from the vaccine manufacturer and a cost-impact and costeffectiveness study adhering to NICE methodology, and developed by an academic collaboration.
Bexsero was initially found to be cost-effective. However, following revision of the model based on expert opinion and knowledge of the epidemiology and impact of invasive meningococcal disease (IMD), it was found that use of the vaccine in infants was unlikely to be cost-effective.
The burden and severity of IMD prompted further exploration of the cost-effectiveness via a open consultation on the interim advice. Additional evidence provided resulted in revisions that again reversed this decision: 1) incorporation of quality of life losses to affected patients and their families, 2) increased incidence of IMD, 3) incorporation of data on the rate of minor and severe sequelae following IMD, and 4) inclusion of a proportion of litigation costs associated with meningococcal disease. 
